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Policy Recommendations
•  Recognize the economic, social, and political 
implications of emerging infectious diseases 
(EID), and be prepared to meet international 
security challenges presented by EID outbreaks 
with scientifically sound responses.
•  Prioritize development of proactive, reliable 
EID dection methods as the first step to an 
effective response plan.
•  Support research efforts in human and animal 
disease control strategies and tools that con-
sider a variety of potential contexts in which 
they may be employed.
•  Step up efforts in planning for recovery after 
an EID event to complement detection and 
response research. Develop new tools and 
methods in areas such as animal identification 
and epidemiology of rare events.
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The international security implications of emerging infectious diseases (EID) are sug-
gested by their various definitions. Morse defined emerging diseases as “...infections 
that have newly appeared in a population or have existed but are rapidly increasing 
in incidence or geographic range” (Morse 1995). Applied to animals, this definition 
includes newly recognized diseases such as nipah virus infection of swine, old diseases 
that acquire new properties such as enteritis caused by multidrug resistant Salmonella 
enterica typhimurium DT104, and well-known diseases that appear in a new geo-
graphic region such as the recent introduction of West Nile virus (WNV) into North 
America. Transboundary diseases are a specific subset of potentially emergent plant 
and animal diseases defined by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United 
Nations (1996) as “Those that are of significant economic, trade and/or food security 
importance for a considerable number of countries; which can easily spread to other 
countries and reach epidemic proportions; and where control/management, includ-
ing exclusion, requires cooperation between several countries.” These include some of 
the most significant diseases of livestock: foot-and-mouth disease (FMD), rinderpest, 
Rift Valley fever, African swine fever, avian influenza, etc. Finally we have diseases that 
must, by Morse’s definition, be included as a subset of EID, those caused by bioter-
rorism (including agroterrorism or criminal activity) defined as “the use, or threatened 
use, of biological agents to promote or spread fear or intimidation upon an individual, 
a specific group, or the population as a whole for religious, political, ideological, 
financial, or personal purposes,” with obvious political and security implications. Each 
of these definitions includes geopolitical elements, and the occurrence of an EID event 
may have important consequences for international security.
A National Intelligence Council estimate (2000) clearly describes some of the inter-
national economic, social and political implications of EID. Impairment of socio-
economic development in developing and former communist states could contribute 
to political instability, humanitarian crises and even military conflict in regions of 
interest to the U.S. The socioeconomic impacts of human disease are readily apparent. 
Yet it is important to note that most emerging diseases of humans are zoonotic, they 
are transmitted from animals to humans (Taylor, Latham, and Woolhouse 2001). The 
Recognizing that you  
have a problem is the first 
step to recovery. Proactive, 
reliable EID detection is 
paramount to an effective 
response plan.
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impacts that animal EID may have on developing economies may be equally severe, 
especially where animals serve as sources of food and transportation, as well as acting 
as de facto banks or repositories of wealth. But EID can cause political problems even 
in developed countries as evidenced by the elimination of the Ministry of Agricul-
ture, Forestries and Fisheries (MAFF, roughly the equivalent of the U.S. Department 
of Agriculture) due to furor over its response to a 2001 FMD outbreak in the U.K. 
Restrictions on trade and travel can also complicate international relations even 
between close allies, as the embargoes on U.S. beef exports to Japan and South Korea 
in response to three cases of Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE, or mad cow 
disease) in the U.S. have clearly demonstrated. In the case of bioterrorism, if it can 
be shown to be the result of a state-sponsored group, the consequences are likely to 
be severe, probably resulting in retaliatory action. EID outbreaks may present serious 
international security challenges that require scientifically sound policy responses.
Research can contribute to the prevention or 
mitigation of EID 
Research can contribute to the prevention or mitigation of EID at various levels. To 
paraphrase various self-help books, recognizing that you have a problem is the first 
step to recovery. Thus proactive, reliable EID detection is paramount to an effective 
response plan. Unfortunately, emerging diseases rarely make dramatic appearances. 
The earliest human cases of WNV in the U.S. were dismissed as other commonly 
occurring encephalitides without much fanfare. In fact, it took a veterinary patholo-
gist investigating unusual mortality in wild and captive birds to recognize that this 
was something new, and even then she had trouble convincing public health officials 
that there was a potentially devastating new virus on the scene (U.S. General Account-
ing Office 2000). Currently, detection is largely based on lists of potential infectious 
agents based on their perceived threat, so-called select agent lists. This is prudent 
but insufficient because it is, in fact, impossible to know what the next EID will be. 
Regarding bioterrorism, Tony Cordesman (2001) has stated “From a public policy 
viewpoint, these uncertainties mean the US must prepare for a wide variety of low 
probability attacks...” Such preparation has not been a priority for either human or 
animal disease as efforts have been focused on the select agents. Advances in biotech-
nology may allow development of detection methods which are broad spectrum and 
require little or no prior knowledge of the causative agent. 
Beyond actual detection methods, when faced with an unusual syndrome or preva-
lence of disease, one must ask the following questions:
1.  is this a “new” disease or simply an unusual manifestation of something we know?;
2.  is this a disease that emerged in situ or was it introduced?;
3.  if introduced, what was the route and was the introduction accidental or 
intentional?
4.  what is the current extent of the outbreak, what individuals/populations are most 
susceptible and how fast/far is it likely to spread?
The answers to these questions will determine the nature and magnitude of the policy 
response, from allocation of public health resources to mobilizing the military. These 
are difficult questions, made more so by the fact that policymakers and response 
agencies will need this information almost immediately. Our knowledge is currently 
quite limited regarding these questions and both research and field experience will be 
required to improve our decision-making capabilities.
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One factor often overlooked in evaluating security risks 
associated with disease emergence is the nature of the 
response to a disease emergence event, particularly in 
light of concerns about biowarfare and agroterrorism. 
Responses which might be appropriate under one set 
of conditions could be inappropriate or even danger-
ous under other conditions. For example, the response 
to an outbreak of FMD in South Korea would be quite 
different were it thought to have been an intentional 
introduction from North Korea, rather than an acci-
dental wind-borne introduction from China, with 
considerable difference in security impact (Joo et al. 
2002). Another example is the armed resistance to FMD 
eradication efforts in Mexico between 1946 and 1952, 
by poor farmers whose livelihood was threatened by the 
control policy which forced them to replace draft oxen 
with donkeys, a response more palatable in temperate 
than subtropical climates (Shaw 1949). Unfortunately, 
much of the research into animal disease control strate-
gies and the tools to support them has failed to consider 
a variety of potential contexts in which they may be 
employed (Perry and Sones 2007). Policies based on 
such research could be ineffective or even detrimental if 
applied inappropriately. To avoid these problems, EID 
response policy needs to be appropriate to the popula-
tion, proportional, and as precise as possible.
Finally, planning for recovery after an EID event is an 
area that has received only limited consideration. In a 
scenario eerily similar to that playing out in Iraq, we 
have plans for detecting and attacking an EID event but 
very little sense of what to do after that. For example, 
the index case of BSE in the U.S. detected in December 
2003 was dealt with as expeditiously as possible. The 
case was diagnosed, premises quarantined, the animal 
traced back to its Canadian origin within 48 hours, 
and many in contact animals promptly accounted for. 
However, in 2007, there are still markets closed to U.S. 
beef, and trade issues arising from that animal and 
two subsequent cases continue to be a source of fric-
tion with our trading partners, not to mention loss of 
market share for U.S. producers. The lack of planning 
for the aftermath of an EID event contributes to a lack 
of resilience in this segment of our economy, greatly 
increasing the economic and political impact of even a 
small and well-handled outbreak. Although much of the 
planning for post-EID resilience will not require labora-
tory research, development of new tools and methods 
is necessary in some areas such as animal identification 
and epidemiology of rare events.
The security impact of an EID event will vary both in 
magnitude and form depending on geography, eco-
nomic status, importance of international trade, local 
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and international political situations, among other 
factors. It is critical that these factors be considered in 
designing and interpreting EID research, if the fruits of 
that research are to be useful for reducing the security 
impact of a disease event. It is also important that 
researchers have the skills to communicate the strengths 
and limitations of EID prevention and control strate-
gies to policy makers and stakeholders so that research 
is utilized effectively in the policy making process. 
However, integrating policy considerations into research 
will not happen without active advocacy and outreach 
on the part of the scientific community. Introducing 
students to policy considerations early in their research 
training, encouraging their participation in organiza-
tions involved in policy making and evaluating their 
research in part on its policy impact will be an initial 
step in this direction. Progress may be achieved through 
increasing awareness of security policy issues (and 
research opportunities) amongst established researchers 
through symposia, speakers, and direct interaction with 
policymakers and stakeholders. International security 
will be best served when EID research is informed by 
policy considerations and policy is based on sound EID 
research. 
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Editor’s Note
This publication is the first in a planned series of periodic briefs addressing policy 
aspects of international security issues. Future briefs will cover a range of topics in 
the areas of biodefense, cybersecurity, energy security, nuclear nonproliferation, 
conflict management, and other subjects related to international peace and secu-
rity policy. The primary aim of this series will be to highlight ongoing academic 
research at ACDIS and the University of Illinois that serves to inform federal and 
international policy decisions. 
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